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Abstract
When innovation projects are crowdsourced,
individuals are allowed to form teams and collaborate
to develop a successful solution. In this environment,
teams will be competing with each other, as only the
winning ones take the award home. Should a worker
work alone, so that she or he does not need to share
the award when she or he wins, or should she or he
form a team for a better chance to win? In this paper,
we studied the behaviors of workers in the context of
crowdsourced innovation projects (CIPs). Building
upon the theoretical framework of the organizational
knowledge creation theory (OKCT), we linked team
performance to team formation factors, including team
diversity, team coordination, and task complexity. Our
preliminary analysis showed that team coordination
was an important factor for success. Team diversity in
terms of connectivity was a positive factor towards
better performance, whereas other factors were not
significant. Our study indicates that workers in CIPs
are likely to benefit from collaborations, connectivity
diversity, and role diversity.

1. Introduction
Crowdsourcing refers to "using the Internet to
outsource work to individuals" [15], which recently has
been adopted as a new business model for innovation.
Initially, crowdsourcing was introduced as a way to get
small tasks done, such as image tagging (e.g.,
iStockphoto [3]), sentiment labeling (e.g., Amazon
Turk [17]) and basic programming or editing tasks
(e.g., taskcn [23]). These task-based crowdsourcing
applications were supported by the economy of having
work done cheaply [14] [18]. In these applications, the
workers contribute small pieces of labor, which require
minimal time and effort, and they did not have to
collaborate with others to get the job done. More
recently, crowdsourcing was also used for business
innovation, such as new product design [2] [4] and
problem solving [9] [24]. Idea contribution platforms,
such as Dell’s IdeaStorm [2], allow individuals to
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contribute ideas, and get rewarded if their ideas were
adopted. Coming up with novel ideas does require
users’ basic knowledge of the company and the
product, but the idea contribution action (i.e., posting
comments on the forum) is still quite simple, without
the need of collaborating with other contributors.
In this study, we study and test theories in
knowledge creation and organization theories in the
context of crowdsourced innovation projects (CIPs).
CIPs are defined as projects that are crowdsourced to
the public with the intention of innovation. Data and
existing insights will be released to the public to
develop a solution, such as algorithms, automated
systems, or insights, to be used in the organization for
the longer term. From the business organization’s
perspective, CIPs were crowdsourced for finding novel
solutions more rapidly and more cheaply than hiring
in-house experts [14]. It is also anticipated that novel
analytical solutions will be proposed from the crowd,
outside of the business organization. The most notable
CIPs include the Netflix Prize, which has greatly
improved the accuracy of predictions about whether a
customer will enjoy a recommended movie, and
inspired a new research domain in recommender
systems. Since any person is allowed to try as long as
she or he follows the basic rules, a cross-checking
mechanism (i.e., comparing submission across
different teams) was used for quality assurance. It takes
tremendous amount of time to come up with a solution
irrespective of quality. The workers have to download,
analyze and create models to generate outputs for
submission. Given the complexity of the innovation
projects, workers in the crowd are allowed to form
teams. Each team would then have one or more
members. Forming teams and collaborate effectively
would be a new research issue in the CIPs context.
In the new context of CIPs, we would like to test
the applicability of knowledge creation theories and
organization theories. The specific hypotheses we will
test include: 1) whether team collaboration is a wise
choice for workers in CIPs, and 2) whether more
diverse teams are more likely to succeed. We will also
explore whether externalization patterns could be
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found between teams (in spite of the competition).
Understanding the workers’ behaviors will provide the
basis of theorizing the IS behaviors in this new context,
and shed light on effective design of CIPs in the future.
Our hypotheses and implementations can be
summarized as follows. First, we hypothesize that
forming teams, instead of working alone is beneficial.
Second, we believe forming more diverse teams is
beneficial. The diversity considered in this study is the
mix of new and old members. This can be extended in
the future. Finally, we materialize the efficacy of tacit
coordination by examining whether each pair of
members maintain their collaboration in the future.
Since there is a large variation in all competitions
hosted, we consider the moderating effect of
competition difficulty, inspired by the task complexity
theory. Our empirical analysis has partially supported
these hypotheses, and we also attempted to provide
evidences to the four communications patterns in the
organizational knowledge creation theory.
The novelty and contributions of this paper can be
summarized as follows. Existing theories have not
been tested in the new context of CIPs, which are
based on an online platform that introduces both
competition among teams (via the scoreboard) and
knowledge sharing (via the discussion forum). Our
study is the first to investigate the benefit of
collaboration in CIPs, and the impact of other factors,
such as team diversity and task complexity.

2. Theoretical background
In this study, we adopt knowledge creation and
collaboration theories to build our research model, and
test them in the context of CIPs. In particular, we adopt
organizational knowledge creation theory (OKCT) as
the overarching framework. According to the logic of
tacit coordination theory and task complexity theory,
we tested the relationship between performance and
team diversity, task complexity, and team coordination.

2.1 Organizational knowledge creation theory
Organizational knowledge creation theory (OKCT)
is a widely adopted theory in organizational and team
knowledge management [29]. According OKCT,
organizational knowledge can be classified as explicit
knowledge (i.e., codified knowledge transmittable in
formal, systematic language), and tacit knowledge (i.e.,
personalized knowledge that is hard to formalize or
communicate, and rooted deeply in action,
commitment and involvement in the context).
Teams that work on CIPs are formed ad hoc and
informal, explicit knowledge may not be regularly
codified within the team, but could be indirectly

inferred by observing the team’s performance. In the
literature, the observable performance was commonly
adopted as a proxy variable for explicit knowledge
content [16][34]. Furthermore, tacit knowledge is
personalized knowledge that is owned by individual
members, not necessarily communicated formally (e.g.,
via meetings or documentation). She or he may acquire
from or transfer to the team her or his tacit knowledge.
Such within-team interactions, however, are hard to
record or measure for CIPs.
In the context of CIPs, there are arguably two
possible layers of organization: the team level (i.e.,
each team consists of one or more members) and the
community level (i.e., all competing teams who are
allowed to participate in a common discussion forum).
The interactions among members of the same team
normally happen offline, and may not be easily
observable, as teams tend to form offline among people
with existing social ties. In fact, previous study has
shown that in terms of the social ties among
participants of the CIPs, there is a large number of
connected components in the social graph, that are
completely disconnected from others [24]. Coupled
with the competitive nature of the relation among the
teams, we can reasonably believe that the participants
tend to be isolated online between teams, and rather,
more fully connected offline within teams. A typical
scenario is that a group of graduate students, who are
well acquainted with each other in class, decided to
form a team and work together on a CIP together. As a
result, even though we have no information at the
lower level organization (i.e., within the team), we can
possibly measure interactions at the community level
(i.e., on the discussion forum across teams).
In the OKCT framework, organizational knowledge
is created via four patterns of interactions:
socialization, combination, internalization, and
externalization [27]. Socialization is concerned with
the exchange of tacit knowledge among individuals,
and combination refers to the interactions to combine
explicit knowledge as a group, through meeting and
conversation or
using
information systems.
Internalization refers to convert explicit knowledge
into tacit knowledge, whereas externalization converts
tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge.
At the team level, since most interactions happen
offline, we have no access to the information.
However, since forum posts are visible to the public
and allows for knowledge sharing outside of the
participating teams, some of the four patterns in the
OKCT framework could be assessed at the community
level. The discussion forums for CIPs are normally
used for sharing knowledge or information. When
users directly reply to each other’s posts, we consider it
an action of socialization. All users that participated in
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the forum discussions represent their teams who
participated in combination (since all posts stay).
Moreover, we can further separate forum posts into
two categories: information acquiring and knowledge
sharing. Information acquiring happens when a poster
asks questions, seeking to internalize knowledge from
the community. Knowledge sharing happens when a
posts answers other people’s questions, seeking to
externalize the knowledge.
Note that interactions on the discussion forum are
the primary interactions among the teams because they
are not acquainted offline. We might contrast teams
with an active forum member with those without.
However, we cannot track the viewing log of
participants, so it is hard to see which members
combined knowledge from the forum without speaking
up (i.e., posting a post). We can measure the
socialization patterns in the CIPs community by the
interactions on the forum.

Even though we know very little about the
participants’ background, and thus have no basis of
judging for their skills diversity, we could measure
other kinds of team diversity, i.e., experience, role, and
connectivity diversities. In the context of small-group
decisions, it was found that different diversity
measures may have different effects on the decision
efficacy [35]. In particular, in CIPs, we further
established the diversity hypothesis into the following
before testing them separately:
H2a (Experience diversity): teams with both older
and newer members are more likely to perform better.
H2b (Role diversity): if some and not all of the
team members use the forum, the team is more likely to
perform better.
H2c (Connectivity diversity): if the team has both
more connected and less connected members (based on
social network metrics such as connectivity), the team
is more likely to perform better.

2.2 Team diversity
2.3 Team coordination
The benefits of making teams in a competitive
environment may seem obvious due to the general
belief in better performance by more diverse teams,
especially due to expertise coverage [16][21][34].
However, the theory has not been tested in CIPs.
Possible benefits of forming teams with collaborators
may include better chances to win (as empowered by
the combined knowledge), and better retention (i.e.,
keep trying for a longer time), which in turn, will
increase the chance to win, or at lease show
improvement over time.
However, there are also drawbacks for forming a
team. First, if they win, they have to share the money
with fellow team members, the expected reward,
therefore, is substantially reduced. Second, there is
possible collaboration cost, such as communication
overhead (e.g., scheduling a meeting), flexibility in
realizing personal ideas, etc. This can be especially a
concern when the team is huge. Last but not the least,
the competition rules normally limit at most one
submission per day. If four people work individually,
they could submit four times in total. (The rule does
forbid sharing data across teams, to avoid purposeful
reverse engineering.)
H1: In CIPs, teams with multiple members perform
better than teams with a single member.
We believe that forming teams rather than
competing alone has a number of benefits due to the
dynamics of knowledge creation and knowledge
sharing process, however, this benefit relies on
effective team forming and collaboration.
H2: In CIPs, for teams with more than one
member, more diverse teams perform better.

Coordination, either explicit or implicit, is the
process of implementing teamwork, and is oftentimes
defined as “the process of managing dependencies
between activities” [26]. According to the visibility of
coordination activities, Rico et al. [30] divide
coordination into explicit coordination and tacit
coordination. Explicit coordination refers to team
members’ intentional use of explicit manners, such as
communication,
to
articulate
plans,
define
responsibilities, negotiate deadlines, and seek
information to accomplish the shared goals [7] [26]. In
contrast, tacit coordination captures the capability of a
team to act in concert by predicting the needs of the
task and the team members, and adjust behavior
accordingly, without overt communication [7] [30].
Therefore, the two basic dimensions of implicit
coordination are anticipation and dynamic adjustment
[30]. That is, team members can formulate other
members’ demands and actions by monitoring their
progress with the task and their performance, and
accordingly
provide
task-related
information,
proactively share tasks and adjust their own behaviors
to keep in line with others’ work without previous
requests or direct notification.
The focus on explicit coordination is prevalent in
previous research, which proves its undoubted
importance. However, some studies acknowledge that
explicit coordination only reveals one aspect of team
coordination [30], and good coordination is nearly
invisible [26] – but this does not mean that these two
coordination mechanisms are opposite [30] [20].
Instead, prior research suggests that good coordination
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is a subtle mixture of explicit and tacit coordination
[10], so these two kinds of coordination process can
exist at the same time, and well-developed explicit
coordination can leverage the development of tacit
coordination.
Prior research about the explicit coordination
mechanism suggests that team members coordinate
explicitly by using task organization mechanisms or by
communicating [8] [26]. However, task organization
mechanisms such as planning and scheduling are less
effective when the task has no or few routines because
dependencies can no longer be managed in a
programmed way [7]. Therefore, in our research about
temporary CIPs, we focus on communication as the
main tacit coordination mechanism, and it is also the
dominant manner adopted by participants.
Tacit coordination is considered as the primary
form of team coordination in CIPs because there is no
formal organizational designation of roles or positions.
However, we could possible probe into the roles
according to other activity records (e.g., forum).
H3: Teams that coordinated better are more likely
to perform better.

2.4 Task complexity
Task complexity has also been an important issue
in IS theories, and applicable to our case. Task
complexity is often considered as a moderator between
teamwork and performance [1] [6] [12] [22] [28] [31].
In the context of CIPs, different competitions have
vastly different levels of difficulty. Even though there
is no direct measurement or indicator of level of
difficulty, we can observe each competition’s award
amount (which is normally positively correlated with
difficulty and participation), and the number of
participating teams (which represents the intensity of
competition.)
More specifically, task complexity can be included
as a moderating variable. The level of difficulty is
positively correlated with many of the following
observable/unobservable
factors:
amount
of
price/reward expected; number of participating teams;
whether the problem/data or the hosting company is
interesting; and whether the problem is well defined or
not. In this study, we simply use the number of
participating teams (taken logarithm) as the proxy to
task complexity. This is because it is not only easy to
measure, but also directly affect the intensity of
competition. After all, any team needs to rank on the
top in order to receive the award. It also reflects the
outcome of the other variables.
H4: The relative performance of a team is not
dependent upon the difficulty of a competition.

3. Research design
Our study is based on a real-world dataset from a
popular website that hosts CIPs. In this section, we will
introduce the operationalization details.

3.1 Data collection
Kaggle.com is an online platform that provides
crowdsourcing solutions for companies and non-profit
organizations to get access to a large pool of analytical
expertise. This platform hosts one of the world’s
biggest data science communities, which attracts
experts from all over the world to participate in the
CIPs, which are normally formulated as problemsolving competitions. Each competition is normally set
up by providing a brief problem description, a page
with links for data download and documentation, and a
pre-specified set of performance metric, general
participation rules, and awards information. The
winning team needs to beat naive baselines or an
existing model. This requirement ensures that the final
result will show substantial improvement over triviality
or the state of the art. The competition rules at
Kaggle.com usually require that winners describe their
winning model in exchange for a prize, which is
typically a pre-specified amount of money, and may
include other types of awards, such as conference
travel, plaque, and job positions. The competition rules
may also limit the maximum number of members in a
team, and/or the maximum number of submissions
each day. Kaggle.com has hosted more than 200
competitions in data science so far.
For each competition, there is also a public
scoreboard and a discussion forum. The public
scoreboard dynamically reflects teams’ ranking, using
a random subset of samples, when new submissions are
being made to the website. Once a result (typically, the
output from the team’s model) is submitted to the
website, teams will be ranked according to the
performance on a random partition (e.g., 30%) of the
scoring instances and listed on the public scoreboard.
The actual score on the full scoring set, which will be
used to determine the winners at the end of the
competition, is not released so that teams will not
reverse engineer the results and over-fit the data. Given
the competition among many teams, the best
performing model typically improves the solution
substantially. The discussion forum is where questions
are asked and answered among all members of the
Kaggle community, including Kaggle moderators. On
the forum, there is a feature that allows users to click
on the “thank” button to mark posts with useful

384

information. The number of thanks to each post is
visible to all forum participants.
The competition dataset was shared by Kaggle.
This dataset includes the competitions information, the
submission records, and the team-membership data.
The competitions data include summary information of
the competitions, such as award amount, number of
teams participated, and number of entries submitted,
which could be used to infer task complexity. The
submissions data includes all teams’ submission
history and their ranking on the public scoreboard,
saved in CSV files. Each submission is associated with
a timestamp, the performance score (by the prespecified metric, such as misclassification rate or F1
measure), and the temporary (i.e., at the time of
submission) and final (i.e., at the end of the
competition period) ranking. After filtering out nonpublic competitions and those that were still in
progress at the time of data collection, our preliminary
dataset included 40,377 submission records to 57
competitions.
A second part of the dataset consists of the forum
discussion activities, which was crawled using Python.
We were able to clean and match 44 of the
competitions to our preliminary set of competitions.
The crawled information was then formatted into a
CSV table, where each row corresponds to a post
(including the initiating post and the follow-up replies),
and the columns include the author (identified by
username), the thread (identified by post title), the
sequence number in the thread, and the number of
“thanks” received from others. We can track each
individual member’s activities on the forum by their
identifiable user names. Different from the public
scoreboard data, the forum posts are submitted by
individual team members, and thus we can differentiate
the roles of those individuals in the team (i.e., whether
a forum user, who communicates outside of the team
with the whole community). Even though we have not
performed a text mining and/or content analysis on the
posts, we were able to easily quantify the value of
content contributed by each user using the number of
“thanks”. In the future, we can also do text mining to
find out the quality, content, or contribution of each
post.

3.2 Extraction of social network metrics
A social network is typically modelled as a graph
structure, where nodes represent actors of the system,
and edges represent their relations. As a result, many
graph based methods and tools are applicable for
solving problems formulated in the social network
context. A thorough text of related concepts and
examples may be found in [13] or [5]. Extracting the

wisdom of the crowd through social network analysis
has also been found to be effective in many
applications [10][32].
Since each team may have one or more members
on Kaggle (and a member can only participate in one
team that submits to a competition), the relationship
between teams and members may be represented and
analyzed as a bipartite graph. The bipartite graph, also
known as two-mode network or affiliation network, is
a special type of graph that is particularly suitable for
modeling the relationship between two types of entities
[25]. It is common practice to project a two-mode
network into one mode, so that existing (one-mode)
network analysis techniques may be readily applied.
This approach is particularly useful when the primary
interest is on the relationship among one of the modes.
In our case, it is interesting to look into the social
relation among individual members to assess their
connectivity.
The team-membership data were used to create the
affiliation network, based on which we constructed the
social network among individual participants.
Essentially, we link two individuals in the social graph
if they have ever collaborated in any one or more
competition. Our preliminary dataset included 30,142
links among 26,971 teams that involve 19,277 unique
members. Using the igraph package in R, we were able
to easily create a bipartite graph between teams and
members, map it into the member-member social
network, and then calculate the degree centrality (i.e.,
number of directly connected members) for each
member. Finally, we calculated the variance in team
member’s degree to represent the team’s connectivity
diversity.

3.3 Partially observed team characteristics
We would like to infer the efficacy of the team’s
knowledge creation process, which is reflected in the
performance (e.g., ranking or score) or activities (e.g.,
number of attempts) of the teams. Even though there is
no formal explicit and tacit knowledge data available,
we started by using team performance as a proxy
variable to represent the amount of knowledge.
Tacit or implicit coordination is not observable, so
we began by quantifying the overall compatibility
between pairs of team members. Even though there is
no chance of surveying team member’s satisfaction
during the collaboration process, we could observe the
team composition to see if the members continued to
collaborate in the future. A team with good tacit
coordination should result in positive collaboration
experience, and the members are more likely to
continue to collaborate in future. As a result, for each
pair of members in a team, we calculated the ratio
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between the number of competitions they collaborated
and the number of all completions that either of them
participated (i.e., the Jaccard coefficient) afterwards.
Since tacit coordination is unobservable, we could
build a hidden Markov model (HMM) to represent the
“health” status of a team. HMM was successfully used
in the literature to infer patients’ health statuses based
on their online activities [33]. Evolution of team
performance over time can be tracked and used as
external evidence of collaboration status. We adopted
HMM to estimate the latent satisfaction for team
performance.

3.4 Operationalization of variables
For each competition, we summarized a number of
variables for each participating team. Table 1 provides
definitions and operationalization of variables that we
included in modeling.
Table 1: Operationalization of variables (i =
team, j = competition)
Variable
Description
Measurement
Dependent Variable: Team Performance
Team
Percentile (ranging from 0 to 1,
Pij
Performance
where 1 means the best
performance) of the best score
of team i in competition j
amongst all submissions on the
scoreboard.
Independent Variable: Team Diversity
Experience
Entropy (0-1) of the proportion
Vei
Diversity
of new members.
Role
Entropy (0-1) of the proportion
Vri
Diversity
of forum users.
Connectivity
The variance in members’
Vci
Diversity
degree centrality in the social
graph.
Independent Variable: Team Coordination
Team
The average of the pairwise
Cij
Coordination satisfaction score among team
i’s members at the end of
competition j
Independent Variable: Task Complexity
Competition
Number
of
teams
that
Dj
Difficulty
participated in competition j,
taken logarithm

The dependent variable, team performance, is
measured as the percentile of the best score of team i
toward competition j, amongst all submissions to this
competition. In order to build a regression model to
explain team performance using other variables, we
transformed it into the logit score, so that the
dependent variable follows a Normal distribution.
The first independent variable, team diversity,
could be measured in various ways, such as experience
diversity, role diversity, and connectivity diversity. For
experience diversity, we calculated the entropy based

on the proportion of new members among all members
of team i. A new member is defined as one who was
never part of a team that made a submission to any
other competition before the request date. Note that
there is a large number of teams with just one member,
for which the diversity is zero. Combined with other
teams that have either new users only or experienced
users only, the number of teams with some diversity is
very small. We then decided to dichotomize this
variable: whether the team has diversity or not. Similar
treatment was done to role diversity as the entropy of
forum users. The connectivity diversity is measured as
the variance in degree centralities of team members
when assessed in the context of their collaboration
social network.
The
second
independent
variable,
team
coordination, is calculated as the average of all
pairwise coordination satisfaction scores. The
coordination satisfaction score of any given pair of
members, say, A and B, is calculated as the number of
competitions that A and B completed together later
than competition j, divided by the total number of
competitions that either A or B participated later than
competition j (up to the end of the study period).
The third independent variable, task complexity is
measured by the number of unique teams that
participated in the competition, taken logarithm. The
actual task complexity was not directly measurable.
The most accurate indicator would be the award
amount, as judged by the competition sponsor.
However, such award amount is also a function of the
sponsor’s brand value and the importance of the
problem to the sponsor. The number of participating
teams, therefore, is the most direct and practical to
measure how difficult it is to win. Since the raw values
have a highly skewed distribution, we started by taking
the log transformation. After looking at the distribution
of the transformed values (i.e., log counts), we decided
to discretize into a three-level ordinal variable.
Namely, high, medium, and low levels of difficulty.

3.5 Empirical Model
Our empirical model can be summarized as
follows, where we vaguely use V to represent one or
more types of team diversity:

 p
log  ij
1 p
ij



   0  1  Vi   2  Cij   3  D j   ij .



Our goal is to explain teams’ performances by the
team’s diversity, coordination, and the competition’s
level of difficulty. Note that according to our data
processing setup, experience diversity is a dummy
variable, and competition difficulty is a three-level
categorical variable.
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4. Findings
In this section, we report initial findings. Overall,
we found that collaborations are helpful. Teams that
involve multiple members perform much better than
those with just one member. Using one competition as
an example, and by modeling the latent states of each
team over time, we found that collaboration is
particularly helpful for teams that rank in the middle.
Our comprehensive empirical models indicate that
team coordination and connectivity diversity are
positively associated with performance, whereas the
experience diversity is not. The competition difficulty
was found insignificant.

4.1 Collaboration is good for CIPs
The first thing we looked at was the team size. In
our dataset, the team size had a highly skewed
distribution. More specifically, there were 10346 onemember teams, 512 two-member teams, 162 threemember teams, 51 four-member teams, 27 fivemember teams, and the remaining 32 teams with six or
more members. Since the distribution is so skewed, we
combined the teams with more than one member, and
focused on comparing between single-member teams
and multi-member teams.
We noticed was that it was rewarding to team up
with others rather than working alone. When
comparing teams with just one member (called
“singles,” the same hereafter) and those with multiple
members (called “multiples,” same hereafter), we
found that the former (n=10346) performs much poorer
than the later (n=784).
More specifically, the singles teams have an
average of 0.013 in logit scores (that is, roughly 50.3%
of other submissions were worse than them) of
percentiles (SD=1.729); and the multiples group has an
average of 0.744 in logit scores (that is, roughly 67.8%
of other submissions were worse than them) of
percentiles (SD=1.960), with a low p-value. It is not
surprising that a test with so large a sample size tends
to be highly significant, however, the gap in the
average performance (i.e., effect size) is quite large,
too. This indicates that it is more likely to succeed
when teaming up with others, rather than working
alone. Therefore, H1 is well supported.

4.2 Collaboration has different effects for
teams in different latent states
Thinking about the root why teaming up would
help competitors perform better, we used the HMM
model to estimate the latent state of each tem. Using

one competition as an example, while tracking the
progress over time, we categorize the “health” of each
team into one of the following three levels: Good,
Medium, and Bad. HMM is a commonly used model to
estimate a latent variable that may change over time. It
represents all the unobservable information within the
team that could lead to externally reflected team
performances (e.g., ranking, or logit score of
percentiles).
Table 2 and Table 3 are the transition matrices
among the three states, for singles teams and multiples
teams, respectively. We can find several patterns by
comparing the two transition matrices.
Table 2: Transition Matrix for Singles
Good
Medium
Bad
0.80
0.20
0.00
Good
0.00
0.33
0.67
Medium
0.22
0.00
0.78
Bad
Table 3: Transition Matrix for Multiples
Good
Medium
Bad
0.57
0.00
0.43
Good
0.26
0.74
0.00
Medium
0.00
0.39
0.61
Bad
First, for mediocre players, if they stay single, they
have very little chance to get to the good level, and a
high chance (67%) to become bad. However, if they
team up with others, their team status has quite some
probability (26%) to become good, and very low
probability to become bad. Thereby, for medium level
workers, it would be quite beneficial to form or join a
team.
Moreover, for good workers, if they stay single,
they have very low probability to become bad.
However, if they form a team with others, their
chances of staying good reduces from 80% to 57%,
and their chances to become bad also increases
tremendously to a (43%). It is possible that people who
are proficient working alone (i.e., good singles) would
more easily manage the work on their own and avoid
the collaboration overhead.
Finally, workers in the bad state are likely to stay
bad (78%), or become good (22%) when they work
alone. However, if they were part of a team, they have
very little chance to become good, in spite of a reduced
chance (61%) to stay bad. This indicates that “bad”
teams do not benefit from collaboration.

4.3 Positive factors for success
After operationalizing the variables, we found a
sample size of n=334 teams with complete data, upon
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which our regression analysis will be performed. The
teams in our dataset consists of 39.5% high
collaboration satisfaction, 28.4% high experience
diversity, and 43.7% connectivity diversity cases.
Moreover, the difficulty levels of competitions are
18.0% high, 45.2% medium, and all others low.

4.4 Evidences in interaction patterns

Table 4: Regression Analysis Results
Variable
C
Ve
Vc
D=High
D=Low

Est.
0.249
-0.128
0.538
0.105
-0.224

S.E.
0.113
0.124
0.112
0.187
0.156

t
2.21
-1.03
4.81
0.56
-1.44

p
0.028
0.305
< 0.001
0.575
0.151

The regression modeling results are reported in
Table 4. We found that team coordination satisfaction
(p=0.028) and connectivity diversity (p<0.001) were
statistically significant, whereas all other variables
were insignificant. The results support H2b and H2c
and does not support H2a. Note that competition
difficulty was insignificant in all cases, meaning that
no matter whether the competition is hard or easy, the
same conclusions hold.
Table 5: Regression Analysis Results with
Subsample (teams with forum users)
Variable
C
Ve
Vc
D=High
D=Low
Vr
C
Ve
Vc
D=High
D=Low

Est.
S.E.
t
Model with Role Diversity
0.096
0.153
0.63
-0.158
0.165 -0.96
0.534
0.155
3.44
0.004
0.264
0.02
-0.415
0.206 -2.01
0.625
0.170
3.68
Model without Role Diversity
0.099
0.159
0.62
-0.169
0.171 -0.99
0.623
0.159
3.91
-0.109
0.273 -0.40
-0.329
0.213 -1.55

because, by our operationalization, a team has role
diversity if some (not none, and not all) members
communicates externally via the forum. Such action
indicates likely explicit coordination, which discounts
the value of implicit coordination.

At the community level, we wanted to check the
interaction patterns between team members and the
community. In particular, did the performance
correlate with contributions to outside of the team (i.e.,
in the forum)? Figure 1 shows a comparison in terms
of number of the composition of better or worse
performing teams (i.e., whether their performance was
among the top half of participating team) by different
levels of forum contribution. The forum contribution is
measured as the average number of thanks per post.
There is a large group of teams who either do not use
the forum, or receive no thanks on average (first bar).
We see that a majority of these teams belong to the
underperformer group. The better performing groups
take larger proportions for groups with more forum
contributions. This is consistent with one would
expect: those who create more knowledge internally
are more likely to externalize to the community.

p
0.532
0.340
< 0.001
0.987
0.046
< 0.001
0.534
0.324
< 0.001
0.689
0.124

With a subsample of 44 competitions, we attempted
to test whether role diversity, in terms of who
communicates to the community at the forum, was a
significant factor. Table 5 reports the regression
results with and without role diversity as an
independent variable. Note that our sample size has
been further reduced, but connectivity diversity
remains highly significant. The role diversity is found
significant, too, but team coordination, no matter
whether role diversity is involved, is no longer
significant within this subsample. This likely indicates
that for this subsample (i.e., those with forum data)
role diversity is a much more predictive independent
variable than team coordination. This is reasonable

Figure 1: Performance vs. forum contribution

5. Discussions and implications
Our preliminary analysis indicated that in the
context of CIPs, team coordination is likely a factor for
success in this environment. Even though collaborating
with others is not required, competing as a team is
likely is better choice, especially for teams with
medium level of performance. When they do, they are
more likely to perform better, and stay active for
longer time, which in turn, increases the chance of
winning.
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Our analysis did not find support in the benefits of
experience diversity. The same results hold irrespective
of the level of difficulty. However, further exploration
of the data, including other variable operationalization
approaches, might be worthy of further investigation.

5.1. Implications for research and practice
Understanding the workers’ behavior helps us
better design an innovation project. In particular, our
analysis supports the practice of allowing workers to
form teams, or work alone if they feel more beneficial.
Our findings in significant benefits in connectivity and
role diversity may also indicate that setting different
roles (more/less connected to others) or responsibilities
(some use forum to communicate with the outside)
would be beneficial.
New theories are needed in the new context of
CIPs. There are inherent differences in different types
of crowdsourcing tasks and thus the user commitment,
responsibility in quality control and incentives are all
different. Informed by this study, we should be able to
further develop theoretical analysis on optional project
design. The current literature all assume simple
crowdsourced tasks and tasks like all-pay auctions.

5.2 Challenges and future research
Even though a team is like a team in the
organization, and the team members can collectively
decide which projects to spend time on, the
crowdsourcing market might be quite different/novel in
contrast to teams in an organization. Moreover, there is
a two-layer community in a competition environment.
This scenario is also possible in a company with many
teams who work on related problems, and can compete
for projects. The OKCT did not consider the two-layer
framework and thus could be extended. We could not
fully track the interactions within teams which can be a
limitation. In the future, we are interested in
developing new theories in the context of open
innovation; and empirically and theoretically analyze
the open innovation design for achieving
organizational goals in innovation. Since members
work on different projects with different people over
time, it will also be interesting to study the knowledge
spillover effect. For example, how do knowledge
transfer from one team to another through a member’s
participation?
More thorough intra-team analysis will be
insightful for identifying the different roles and teamlevel decision making processes. First, how do each
team decide to work on which CIPs? When several
competitions are open concurrently, a team’s decision

on taking part in one competition rather than another
may help us understand their preferences [19]. We will
infer the utility function of each project to a team,
which is set up as a monotonous and quasi-concave
function depending on reward types including the
amount of money award, the number of award types,
the level of kudos, the knowledge required by the
project. Therefore, a team can be classified into a
certain type according to preference characteristics.
Inferring the utility function of each project to a team,
according to their participation behaviors, will be
useful for predicting the sensitivity of incentives. The
outcome of will inform decision makers for developing
new crowdsourcing projects in a cost effective way.
For example, for a given analytical problem, how
much do I have to offer in order to collectively
improve my prediction by 10%?
Finally, it will be interesting to extract individual
metrics from forum posts, using text mining techniques
to infer each individual’s incentive, role and activeness
in the team(s).
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